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Interpretable Encoding of Densities
using Possibilistic Logic
Ondrˇej Kuzˇelka1 and Jesse Davis2 and Steven Schockaert3
Abstract. Probability density estimation from data is a widely stud-
ied problem. Often, the primary goal is to faithfully mimic the un-
derlying empirical density. Having an interpretable model that al-
lows insight into why certain predictions were made is often of sec-
ondary importance. Using logic-based formalisms, such as Markov
logic, can help with interpretability, but even in Markov logic it can
be difficult to gain insight into a model’s behavior due to interac-
tions between the logical formulas used to specific the model. This
paper explores an alternative approach to representing densities that
makes use of possibilistic logic. Concretely, we propose a novel way
to transform a learned density tree into a possibilistic logic theory.
An advantage of our transformation is that it permits performing both
MAP and, surprisingly, marginal inference, with the converted pos-
sibilistic logic theory. At the same time, we still retain the benefits
conferred by using possibilistic logic, such as the ability to compact
the theory and the interpretability of the model.
1 INTRODUCTION
A key machine learning task is learning to compactly represent a
probability density from a given set of examples. The resulting distri-
butions can be useful for answering a large variety of queries. While
many sophisticated approaches exist for this task [7, 21, 27, 23, 25,
26] usually the focus is on ensuring that the model as accurately as
possible captures the empirical distribution. Often, this comes at the
expense of interpretability, which makes it difficult to gain insight
into a model’s predictions or to refine it based on feedback from users
or experts.
A natural approach for representing densities in an interpretable
way is to describe them using logical formulas (or in a framework
which is close to logic such as Bayesian networks). Figure 1(a) shows
the idea underlying Markov logic [26], one of the most popular logic-
based frameworks for modelling densities. This example approxi-
mates the density using the propositional formulas α1, ..., α10, each
of which has a corresponding weightwi. In Figure 1(a), the height of
each box is related to the weight associated with the corresponding
formula, and the width represents its set of models. The probability
of a given possible world is defined to be proportional to the expo-
nentiated sum of the weights of the satisfied formulas. Still, it can
be difficult to grasp the intuitive meaning of the weights associated
with the formulas. In the considered example, for instance, α1 has
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one the highest weights, which could incorrectly give the impression
that models of α1 are highly probable.
This paper explores an alternative approach, also based on
weighted logical formulas, which is illustrated in Figure 1(b). Here, a
weight’s meaning is clear as there is a more explicit relationship be-
tween it and the probability of the corresponding possible worlds: a
formula β with weight 1− p means that its models can have at most
a probability of p. Thus, weighted formulas are seen as constraints
that act on the set of possible worlds. In Figure 1(b), the most prob-
able worlds are exactly those that satisfy ¬β1, ...,¬β9. Similarly, if
the weight associated with formulas β5 and β6 is 1 − p1, then the
worlds whose probability is higher than p1 are exactly those who
satisfy ¬β1, ...,¬β4,¬β7, ...,¬β9.
(a) Additive approximation (b) Constraint based approximation
Figure 1. Two ways of approximating a density using logical formulas.
To the best of our knowledge, we present the first such constraint-
based representation of probability densities in a logical setting.
Specifically, the approach we propose consists of estimating a den-
sity tree [25] from a given set of examples, and then converting it into
a possibilistic logic theory [8]. Possibilistic logic is a well-known
representation and reasoning formalism that supports non-monotonic
inferences, which is a requirement if we are to model probability
densities. At the same time, it remains close to classical logic, which
helps with interpretability and means that off-the-shelf SAT solvers
enable highly efficient reasoning. We present several novel ways to
perform this transformation. We show that it is possible to perform
both MAP and, surprisingly, marginal inference, with the converted
possibilistic logic theory. Using possibilistic logic confers several ad-
vantages. First, because possibilistic logic remains close to classi-
cal logic, we can exploit logical inference to reduce the size of the
learned theories, sometimes leading to theories that are exponentially
smaller than the corresponding density trees. Second, we can im-
prove the quality of learned possibilistic logic theories by taking into
account feedback or input from experts. To this end, we provide an
algorithm for retraining the weights of the possibilistic logic theory
that preserves the expert’s modifications. Finally, the resulting theo-
ries should be more interpretable.
An implementation of the methods described in this paper is avail-
able online4.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Possibilistic logic
Syntax A theory in possibilistic logic is a set of formulas
{(α1, λ1), ..., (αn, λn)} with each αi a propositional formula and
λi a certainty weight in ]0, 1]. The standard inference relation in
possibilistic logic follows the principle of the weakest link, i.e.
{(α1, λ1), ..., (αn, λn)} ` (α∗, λ∗) if the following entailment
holds in classical logic: {αi |λi ≥ λ∗} |= α∗. In other words, we
can derive (α∗, λ∗) iff we can classically derive α∗ without using
formulas whose certainty weight is strictly less than λ∗.
The λ-cut of a possibilistic logic theory Θ is defined as the clas-
sical theory Θλ = {γ|(γ, µ) ∈ Θ and µ ≥ λ}. A non-monotonic
consequence relation `poss can be defined for possibilistic logic as
follows. Consider a possibilistic logic theory Θ and formula α. Let
λ∗ be the highest certainty value for which {α}∪Θλ∗ is inconsistent
(and λ∗ = 0 if there is no such certainty value). Then (Θ, α) `poss β
iff the entailment {α} ∪ {αi | (αi, λi) ∈ Θ, λi > λ∗} |= β holds
in classical logic. Note that all formulas whose certainty weight is at
most λ∗ are ignored, even if they are unrelated to any inconsistency
in Θ. This is known as the drowning effect.
Semantics The semantics of possibilistic logic are defined in terms
of possibility distributions. A possibility distribution, in this context,
is a mapping pi from the set of possible worlds Ω to [0, 1]. A possi-
bility distribution induces two uncertainty measures: the possibility
measure Π and its dual N , defined for A ⊆ Ω as [30, 10]:
Π(A) = max
a∈A
pi(a) N(A) = 1−Π(Ω \A)
We will also write N(α) as an abbreviation for N(JαK), where α
is a propositional formula and JαK is its set of models. Intuitively,
Π(α) reflects the degree to which α is compatible with our avail-
able beliefs, while N(α) reflects the degree to which α is con-
sidered certain. At the semantic level, the possibilistic logic theory
Θ = {(α1, λ1), ..., (αn, λn)} corresponds to the possibility distri-
bution pi defined by (ω ∈ Ω):
pi(ω) = 1−max{λi |ω 6|= αi} (1)
where we assume max ∅ = 0. It is easy to see that, for N the neces-
sity measure induced by pi, it holds that N(αi) ≥ λi. Moreover, it
can be shown that Θ ` (α, λ) iff N(α) ≥ λ [20].
2.2 Density estimation trees
A density estimation tree5 is a rooted directed binary tree in which
internal nodes are labelled by propositional variables (attributes) and
leaves are labelled by real numbers (“densities”). Nodes(T ) denotes
the set of the nodes in tree T and Leaves(T ) the set of its leaves.
Edges are labelled by 0 (false) or 1 (true). A path from the root
4 https://github.com/supertweety/
5 In this paper we only consider density estimation trees involving Boolean
variables. In general, density estimation trees can also define probability
densities in continuous domains.
to a leaf is called a branch. We will represent branches by con-
junctions. For instance, let a1, 0, ai2 , 1, . . . , 1, aik−1 , 0 be the se-
quence of labels of internal nodes and edges corresponding to a
branch from the root N1, labelled with propositional variable a1,
to a leaf Nik . Then the conjunction corresponding to this branch is
¬a1 ∧ ai2 · · · ∧ ¬aik−1 . We call branches paths or conjunctions in-
terchangeably. A density estimation tree defines a probability distri-
bution on possible worlds where the probability of a world ω is given
by the label of the leaf of the unique branch B which is consistent
with ω (i.e. such that ω |= B). Importantly, density estimation trees
can be learned efficiently from data [25].
3 REPRESENTING DENSITY TREES IN
POSSIBILISTIC LOGIC
Next, we show how we can transform a density tree into a possibilis-
tic logic theory. Surprisingly, this transformation permits computing
marginal probabilities from the possibilistic logic theory.
3.1 Transforming density trees
We start with a basic transformation which is similar in spirit to trans-
forming a decision tree into a CNF formula.
Transformation 1. Let T be a density estimation tree. Let B =
{B1, . . . , Bk} be the set of all branches of the tree, represented
as conjunctions, and let p1, . . . , pk be the estimated probabilities of
worlds consistent with the respective branches, i.e. if ω |= Bi then
p(ω) = pi. We define the possibilistic logic theory corresponding to
T as ΘT = {(¬Bi, 1− pi)|Bi ∈ B}.
Proposition 1. If T is a density estimation tree and ΘT is its pos-
sibilistic logic theory constructed by Transformation 1, then for all
possible worlds ω, it holds that p(ω) = pi(ω), where p(.) is the prob-
ability given by T and pi(.) is the possibility distribution associated
with ΘT .
Proof. Let ω be a possible world, T be a density estimation tree and
B = {B1, . . . , Bk} be the set of all its branches, represented as con-
junctions. Let B∗ ∈ B be a branch consistent with ω and p∗ be the
respective density, i.e. ω |= B∗. Clearly, there can be only one such
branch as all the branches in T are mutually exclusive. Likewise, the
only rule (α′, λ′) ∈ Θ which is not satisfied in ω is (¬B∗, 1 − p∗).
By (1), we therefore have pi(ω) = 1− (1− p∗) = p∗. It follows that
for any ω ∈ Ω we have pi(ω) = p(ω).
Remark 1. Transformation 1 works in timeO(|Nodes(T )|2). A pos-
sibilistic logic theory constructed by Transformation 1 from a density
estimation tree T has at most |Leaves(T )| rules and its size, i.e. the
sum of the lengths of its rules, is bounded by |Nodes(T )|2. Figure
2 shows an example of a tree, whose possibilistic logic representa-
tion is quadratic. Specifically, the size of the possibilistic logic theory
constructed from such a tree of depth k (which has size S = 2k − 1
nodes) by Transformation 1 is of order O(k2) which is also of order
O(S2).
In Section 4.1 we will show how the size of the constructed possi-
bilistic logic theories can be reduced, often significantly. As we will
see, there are cases where the reduced possibilistic logic theories are
exponentially smaller than the trees from which they were created.
Next we give an example of applying Transformation 1.
Figure 2. A tree whose possibilistic logic representation is quadratic.
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Figure 3. A density estimation tree from Example 1.
Example 1. Applying Transformation 1 to the density estimation tree
T in Figure 3 yields the following possibilistic logic theory
Θ = {(¬bird ∨ antarctic ∨ flies, 1),
(¬bird ∨ ¬antarctic ∨ ¬flies, 1),
(¬bird ∨ ¬antarctic ∨ flies, 0.9375),
(bird ∨ ¬flies, 0.875),
(¬bird ∨ antarctic ∨ ¬flies, 0.8125),
(bird ∨ flies, 0.75)}.
Notice that we have, e.g. (Θ, ∅) `poss ¬bird, (Θ, {bird}) `poss flies∧
¬antarctic.
Remark 2. In the possibilistic logic theory obtained by Transfor-
mation 1, the formula with the lowest weight always drowns, i.e. it
is inconsistent with the other formulas and will thus never play a
role in the evaluation of `poss. In many cases, it is therefore possible
to remove this formula from the theory. However, if we want to use
the possibilistic logic theory for probabilistic inference, as in Section
3.2, then we must keep the lowest level in the theory (although we can
replace it by⊥) in order to keep the information about the numerical
value of the probability of the most probable worlds.
Transformation 1 differs from the standard probability-possibility
transformation [11]. For completeness, we present the syntactical
counterpart of the standard probability-possibility transformation in
Appendix A.1. In fact, both transformations induce the same ranking
of possible worlds (since both are identical to the ranking induced
by the probability distribution). Therefore, any classical formula α
which can be derived using the possibilistic entailment operator `poss
from a theory obtained by one of the transformations can also be
derived from the theory obtained by the other transformation.
It is beneficial for scalability to simplify the possibilistic theory
as much as possible already while performing the transformation, or
at least without having to check logical entailment. To this end, we
describe a simple modification of Transformation 1 which results in
smaller possibilistic logic theories.
Transformation 2. Let T be a density estimation tree. Let B =
{B1, . . . , Bk} be the set of all branches of the tree, represented
as conjunctions, and let p1, . . . , pk be the estimated probabilities of
worlds consistent with the respective branches, i.e. if ω |= Bi then
p(ω) = pi. Let us assume w.l.o.g. that pi ≥ pi+1. The resulting
possibilistic logic theory then consists of possibilistic logic formulas
(¬B′i, 1 − pi) where each B′i is a conjunction and is obtained as
follows:
• Without loss of generality, let Bi = bi1 ∧ · · · ∧ biji where its con-
juncts are ordered so that the node labeled by bis is closer to the
root of T than the node labeled by bt whenever s < t.
• Let B′i = bi1 ∧ · · · ∧ bir be the minimal prefix of Bi such that there
is no j < i such that Bj contains B′i as a prefix.
Proposition 2. Transformation 1 and Transformation 2 produce
equivalent possibilistic logic theories.
Proof. Let us denote by ΘA the result of Transformation 1 and by
ΘB the result of Transformation 2. To prove this proposition it is
enough to show that ΘA and ΘB correspond to the same possibil-
ity distribution. Let BA1 , . . . , BAk be defined as in Transformation 1
and let BB1 , . . . , BBk be defined as in Transformation 2. Let ω be a
possible world and let ¬BAi∗ be the only formula from ΘA not sat-
isfied in ω (it follows from the proof of Proposition 1 that there is
only one such formula in ΘA). Clearly the respective formula ¬BBi∗
cannot be satisfied in ω (because ¬BBi∗ implies ¬BAi∗ ). Let 1 − pi∗
be the weight of ¬BAi∗ in ΘA (equal to the weight of ¬BBi∗ in ΘB).
What we need to show is that ¬BBi∗ has the highest weight among
the formulas from ΘB which are not satisfied in ω. It follows from
the way Transformation 2 works that any such formula would neces-
sarily have to be a prefix of ¬BBi∗ (i.e. a clause consisting of the first
r literals of ¬BBi∗ ). This is because every clause in ΘB is a prefix
of some clause in ΘA and at most one clause from ΘA can be fal-
sified in any possible world ω at the same time. But then it follows
that ¬BBi∗ must have the highest weight among the falsified formulas
because, by construction, there is no clause ¬BBj with j > i∗ which
is a prefix of ¬BBi∗ . It follows that piA(ω) = piB(ω), where piA and
piB are the possibility distributions corresponding to ΘA and ΘB ,
respectively.
The next example illustrates the use of Transformation 2.
Example 2. Let us consider the same density estimation tree as in
Example 1 (shown in Figure 3). The branches of the tree, represented
as conjunctions, are:B1 = ¬bird∧¬flies,B2 = bird∧¬antarctic∧
flies, B3 = ¬bird ∧ flies, B4 = bird ∧ antarctic ∧ ¬flies, B5 =
bird ∧ antarctic ∧ flies, and B6 = bird ∧ ¬antarctic ∧ ¬flies. The
corresponding conjunctions B′i are then (we omit B
′
1 considering
Remark 2):
B′2 =bird, B
′
3 =¬bird ∧ flies
B′4 =bird ∧ antarctic, B′5 =bird ∧ antarctic ∧ flies
B′6 =bird ∧ ¬antarctic ∧ ¬flies
Applying Transformation 2 yields the following possibilistic
logic theory: Θ′ = {(¬bird ∨ antarctic ∨ flies, 1), (¬bird ∨
¬antarctic ∨ ¬flies, 1), (¬bird ∨ ¬antarctic, 0.9375), (bird ∨
¬flies, 0.875), (¬bird, 0.8125)}.
3.2 Answering queries
In this section, we discuss how different types of queries about a
given density can be answered by using the possibilistic logic the-
ory obtained from Transformation 1 or 2. The most natural kinds of
queries to consider, in the context of possibilistic logic, are maximum
a posteriori (MAP) queries, as these only depend on the ordering of
the possible worlds. In particular, we consider the following MAP
inference relation [13]:
(T, α) `MAP β iff ∀ω ∈ max(T, α) : ω |= β
where T is a density tree, α and β are propositional formulas and
max(T, α) is the set of most probable models of α, w.r.t. the proba-
bility distribution induced by T . The next proposition shows that, for
possibilistic logic theories obtained using the introduced transforma-
tions, whatever can be derived using the `MAP relation from the tree
can also be derived using `poss from the respective possibilistic logic
theory, and vice versa.
Proposition 3. If T is a density estimation tree and ΘT is the pos-
sibilistic logic theory constructed using Transformation 1 or 2, or
using Transformation 4 described in the appendix, then for any for-
mulas α and β it holds that
(T, α) `MAP β iff (ΘT , α) `poss β.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that the ranking of possible worlds in-
duced by the probability p(.) defined by the density estimation tree is
the same as the rankings of possible worlds induced by the possibility
distributions pi(.) corresponding with the theories that are obtained
by the three transformations. For Transformation 1 this follows from
Proposition 1. For Transformation 2, this follows from Proposition
1 and Proposition 2. For Transformation 4, this follows from the so-
called order preservation principle, which is known to hold for the
probability-possibility transformation (see [12]).
One important advantage of Transformation 1 and 2 over the stan-
dard probability-possibility transformation is that it permits comput-
ing marginal probabilities directly from the possibilistic logic theory.
In particular, if ΘT is a possibilistic logic theory obtained by Trans-
formation 1 or 2 then the probability of a formula α is
P (α) =
∑
ω:ω|=α
pi(ω). (2)
The convenience of the possibilistic logic encoding lies in the fact
that the sum in (2) can easily be computed using model counting as
follows.
• Let Θ be a possibilistic logic theory obtained by Transformation 1
or 2 and let Λ = {λ1, λ2, . . . , λk} be the set of weights appear-
ing in Θ, sorted in increasing order. Let us set λk+1 = ∞ (for
convenience of notation below). For every λ ∈ Λ let us define
Mαλ = {ω|ω |= Θλ ∪{α}}, with Θλ the λ-cut of Θ as before. In
other words, |Mαλ | is the “model count” of Θλ ∪ {α}.
• We find:
PΘ(α) =
k∑
i=1
(1− λi) ·
(|Mαλi+1 | − |Mαλi |) . (3)
Proposition 4. If Θ is a possibilistic logic theory whose correspond-
ing possibility distribution pi can be interpreted as a probability dis-
tribution (i.e.
∑
ω pi(ω) = 1). Let P be the probability measure in-
duced by pi. It holds that P (α) = PΘ(α).
Proof. We need to show that PΘ(α) =
∑
ω:ω|=α pi(ω). Let Λ and
λk+1 be defined as above. We have∑
ω:ω|=α
pi(ω) =
∑
ω:ω|=α
1−max{λ|(γ, λ) ∈ Θ and ω 6|= γ}
=
k∑
i=1
(1− λi) · |{ω ∈ Ω|ω |= Θλi+1 ∪ {α}}\
{ω ∈ Ω|ω |= Θλi ∪ {α}}| =
k∑
i=1
(1− λi) ·
(|Mαλi+1 | − |Mαλi |)
where the last equality follows from the fact thatMαλi ⊆Mαλi+1 .
If α is just a conjunction of literals, and the possibilistic logic the-
ory Θ is the direct transformation of a density estimation tree, then
performing inference in the tree will likely be more straightforward.
If the theory Θ has been modified (e.g., refined by an expert) or α
is a more complicated formula than a conjunction of literals, then
performing inference directly in the possibilistic logic theory may be
more efficient.
Using possibilistic logic inference, we can also easily characterize
what is true in all worlds whose probability is above a given threshold
θ. In particular, it is easy to see that:
J{α | (α, λ) ∈ Θ, λ > 1− θ}K = {ω | p(ω) ≥ θ}
where p is the probability distribution associated with the density
tree T that was used to construct the possibilistic logic theory Θ,
using Transformation 1 or 2. It follows that the set of formulas
{α | (α, λ) ∈ Θ, λ > 1 − θ} exactly characterizes what is true for
all worlds whose probability is at least θ. Along similar lines, using
model counting as in Eq. 3, we can easily characterize what is true for
the x% most probable worlds, or even the x% most probable worlds
in which some formula α is true.
4 IMPROVING LEARNED THEORIES
Learned possibilistic logic theories may be improved in multiple
ways, some of which we describe in this section.
4.1 Pruning
Exact pruning An important advantage of encoding density esti-
mation trees in possibilistic logic is that the resulting theories can be
simplified based on logical inference. In particular, a weighted for-
mula (α, λ) can be removed from a theory Θ if Θλ \ {α} |= α.
We can iteratively identify and remove such formulas, until the the-
ory Θ is free from redundancies. To further simplify the theory, note
that each of the proposed transformations results in a weighted set of
clauses. Clearly, we can replace the weighted clause (a1∨ ...∨ak, λ)
by the sub-clause (b1∨...∨bl, λ), with {b1, ..., bl} ⊂ {a1, ..., ak}, if
Θλ |= b1∨...∨bl. This often results in substantially smaller theories,
while yielding the same MAP predictions and probability estimates
as the initial density trees.
Example 3. Consider a density tree that assigns a uniform non-zero
probability to worlds satisfying the formula (a1 ∨ a2)∧ (a3 ∨ a4)∧
· · ·∧(an−1∨an), and zero probability to the remaining worlds, then
such a density tree will be exponentially larger than the respective
possibilistic encoding after pruning, which only contains the formu-
las (a1 ∨ a2, λ), ..., (an−1 ∨ an, λ).
Approximate pruning It is possible to further simplify the possi-
bilistic logic theories if we drop the requirement that the associated
possibility distribution should be identical to the probability distri-
bution encoded by the density tree. A particularly convenient way
of reducing possibilistic logic theories is to iteratively merge levels
with consecutive weights, each time simplifying the newly created
level using the exact pruning method outlined above. One possibility
is to iteratively merge the levels with the highest weights, which is
especially useful for MAP inference, as this reduction only affects
the relative ordering of the least probable worlds. Moreover, what-
ever can be derived from the reduced theory by `poss can also be
derived from the original theory, although the converse does not hold
in general. For marginal inference, it is necessary to recompute the
weight of the new level but that is straightforward.
Pruning default rules If we only care about the ordering of the
possible worlds, a possibilistic logic theory Θ may be seen as a com-
pact representation of a default theory, where a default “if α then
typically β” is in this theory if and only if (Θ, {α}) `poss β. In some
cases, e.g. if we want to explain the theories to people without train-
ing in logic, it may be preferable to explain what is captured by a
given possibilistic logic theory by presenting these default rules in-
stead. A set of short default rules which are implicitly encoded by the
possibilistic logic theory can be extracted using a method described
in [19]. The resulting set of defaults is usually too large, however.
We describe a practically efficient and theoretically sound method,
which we also use in the experiments, for pruning sets of default
rules in Appendix A.2.
4.2 Parameter reestimation
Recall that experts can easily modify a possibilistic logic theory.
However, manually modifying a theory obtained using either Trans-
formation 1 or 2 would require us to reestimate the theory’s weights
if we wanted to use it for computing marginal probabilities (perform-
ing MAP inferences does not require retraining the weights). How-
ever, we do not want this retraining to override an expert’s modifi-
cations. Therefore, we require that the reestimated weights have the
same relative ordering as the original weights. This ensures that ev-
erything that can be derived by MAP from the original theory can
also be derived from the theory with the reestimated parameters (but
the probabilities of the possible worlds will be different). Imposing
this restriction makes reestimating the parameters a non-trivial prob-
lem, for which we present a solution in this subsection.
Let E be a multiset of examples which we want to use to rees-
timate the parameters. Let Θ be a possibilistic logic theory, let
Λ = {λ1, . . . , λk} be the set of weights in Θ, ordered increasingly,
let λk+1 =∞ and let PΘ be given by Eq. 3. A maximum likelihood
estimate of the parameters is a solution of the following optimization
problem:
• Variables: λ′1, λ′2, . . . , λ′|Λ|.
• Maximize: ∏ω∈E P (ω) = ∏λi∈Λ(1 − λ′i)|Eλi | where Eλ =
{ω ∈ E|λ = max{λ′|(α, λ′) ∈ Θ and ω 6|= α}}.
• Subject to:
λ′1 < λ
′
2 < · · · < λ′|Λ| (4)
k∑
i=1
(1− λ′i) ·
(
|M>λi+1 | − |M>λi |
)
= 1 (5)
where M>λ1 , . . . , M
>
λj
are as in Eq. 3 where we set α := > (i.e.
α is a tautology).
This is a nonlinear optimization problem which can be solved using
off-the-shelf6 techniques of geometric programming [5]. In particu-
lar, the general geometric programming problem is:
• Minimize: g0(x)
• Subject to:
gi(x) ≤ 1, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m (6)
x > 0 (7)
where x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Rm and gi is a posynomial, i.e.
gi(x) =
∑Ti
j=1 cij
∏N
k=1 x
aijk
k with cij ≥ 0 and aijk ∈ R.
We can follow the same strategy used for maximum likelihood pa-
rameter estimates of a multinomial distribution with order constraints
in [6]. In order to formulate the problem as a geometric programming
problem, we first substitute λ′i := 1 − x. Then we replace |Eλi | by
the relative frequency |Eλi |/|E| and change maximization to mini-
mization by replacing the terms in the maximized product by their re-
ciprocals. We also replace the strict inequalities in Eq. 4 by nonstrict.
A solution close to the optimal but with the strict inequalities satisfied
can then later be obtained by simply adding and subtracting suitably
tiny numbers from the weights. We rewrite each of the nonstrict in-
equalities xi ≥ xi+1 as a posynomial inequality x−1i · xi+1 ≤ 1.
Finally, we also need to replace the equality in Eq. 5 by an inequality
≤ 1, which clearly does not change the solution in this case.
4.3 Ensembles of predictors
Oftentimes, using a model ensemble, which aggregates the predic-
tions of multiple different models, improves modelling performance.
Given an ensemble of density estimation trees T1, T2, . . . , Tn, we
can apply Transformation 1 or Transformation 2 to obtain a possi-
bilistic encoding of the ensemble by constructing possibilistic logic
theories Θ1, Θ2, . . . , Θn and combining them. We first show how to
construct a weighted combination of two possibilistic logic theories
Transformation 3 (Weighted combination of two theories). Let ΘA
and ΘB be two possibilistic logic theories and let a and b, a+b = 1,
be positive real numbers. The weighted combination of ΘA and ΘB
with weights a and b (denoted by a ·ΘA⊕ b ·ΘB) is the possibilistic
logic theory ΘAB constructed as follows:
• For every (α, λ) ∈ ΘA, add (α, a · λ) to ΘAB .
• For every (β, µ) ∈ ΘB , add (β, b · µ) to ΘAB .
• For every pair (α, λ) ∈ ΘA, (β, µ) ∈ ΘB add (α ∨ β, aλ+ bµ)
to ΘAB .
This transformation actually corresponds to a special case of a com-
bination operator for possibilistic logic theories [3], from which we
immediately obtain the following result.
Proposition 5. Let ΘA and ΘB be possibilistic logic theories and
piA and piB be the corresponding possibility distributions. Let pA and
pB be two probability distributions on possible worlds and let a, b,
a+b = 1 be positive real numbers. If for all ω ∈ Ω, pA(ω) = piA(ω)
and pB(ω) = piB(ω) then also a · pA(ω) + b · pB(ω) = piAB(ω)
where piAB is possibility distribution corresponding with a · ΘA ⊕
b ·ΘB .
6 Geometric programming problems can be solved using, e.g. the CVX
toolkit [15, 14].
To construct a uniform combination of possibilistic logic theo-
ries Θ1,Θ2, . . . ,Θk, we can iteratively apply the merging operator
((. . . ( 2
3
· ( 1
2
·Θ1⊕ 12 ·Θ2)⊕ 13 ·Θ3)⊕ ...). The caveat is that the size
of the produced theory may grow exponentially with the number of
combined theories. However, this can be mitigated if we allow some
imprecision and apply the approximate pruning procedure from Sec-
tion 4.1 while iteratively building the combination.
5 EXPERIMENTS
In this section we experimentally evaluate the proposed methods. We
first provide some examples of learned possibilistic logic theories,
after which we present a quantitative evaluation in Section 5.2.
5.1 Illustrative examples
We start by contrasting the interpretability of a learned possibilis-
tic logic theory with a corresponding MRF.7 Then we illustrate how
interpretability in some cases can be further improved by approxi-
mating the possibilistic logic theory using default rules.
Possibilistic logic and MRFs First, we use a credit-default
dataset [29], where we only consider a subset of the variables for
readability. Using the method proposed in this paper, we obtain the
following possibilistic logic theory8:
(¬single, λ0), (¬gradSchool, λ1), (male, λ2), (single ∨ male, λ3),
(male ∨ ¬gradSchool, λ4), (single ∨ university, λ5),
(¬highSchool, λ6), (married ∨ ¬highSchool, λ7),
(¬otherMaritalStatus, λ8), (¬otherSchool, λ8)
As well as a number of integrity constraints such as (¬single ∨
¬married, 1). The theory contains several interesting rules, which
capture the properties that hold for typical people who default on
their credit. These people typically are not single, did not go to grad-
uate school, and are males. If they are females, then typically they are
single, etc. After simplifying the theory with integrity constraints, the
most probable worlds have: married, university, male. While these
pieces of information provide insight, the main advantage of being
able to interpret the model is that we can understand exactly how it
arrives at its predictions and potentially debug it by adding or remov-
ing rules. We now consider a learned MRF for the same dataset:
P (ω) =
1
Z
exp(0.3 · male + 3.8 · gradSchool + 4.3 · university
+3.3 · highSchool− 3.7 · otherSchool + 5.0 · married
+5.1 · single + 1.6 · otherMaritalStatus
−1.0 · (male ∧ otherSchool)− 0.2 · (male ∧ otherMaritalStatus)
−1.7 · (otherSchool ∧ married)− 1.6 · (otherSchool ∧ single)
−10.3 · (gradSchool ∧ university)
−9.4 · (gradSchool ∧ highSchool)− 9.8 · (university ∧ highSchool)
−2.9 · (university ∧ otherSchool)− 11.2 · (married ∧ single)
−8.1 · (married ∧ otherMaritalStatus)
−8.1 · (single ∧ otherMaritalStatus))
7 Recall that propositional Markov logic networks correspond to Markov ran-
dom fields (MRFs).
8 Since in this section, we are only interested in MAP inference, we show
only symbolic weights λ0 < λ1 < . . . in the possibilistic logic theory.
Note that the same cannot be done for MRFs.
Note that the last five lines correspond to the integrity constraints.
Due to the additive combination of the formula’s weights, its predic-
tions are encoded intricately via the interaction between the various
formulas. As this particular MRF is quite small, it may be possible
to gain insight into its preditions with some effort, but with larger
theories this quickly becomes impossible.
Possibilistic logic and default rules To improve interpretability,
possibilistic logic theories can be approximated by sets of default
rules (see Section 4.1). To illustrate this idea, Table 1 shows a pos-
sibilistic logic theory and its approximated set of default rules for a
dataset about the presence of plants in different states of the US and
provinces of Canada [16]. For illustrative purposes, we only consider
California, Montana, New Mexico and Texas. For example, the de-
fault rule nm |∼ tx intuitively means that plants found in New Mexico
are also usually found in Texas. Such rules can be written in a form
that is easy to understand, even for people without training in logic.
5.2 MAP inference and marginal inference
We compare our possibilistic logic theories with learned MRFs on
both MAP and marginal inference tasks. We have considered the
NLTCS, MSNBC, and Plants datasets, which have 16, 17 and 69
propositional variables, respectively. These datasets are divided into
train, tune, and test sets. We learned the models on the train sets and
report results on held-out test sets. We implemented the possibilistic
approach in Java, using SAT4J [4] for SAT solving and RelSat [17]
for model counting. For MRFs we used approximate MAP inference
and Gibbs sampling from the Libra toolkit [22]. For MAP-inference
evaluation, we compare the following models:
PosLog Obtained by Transformation 2 and logical simplification
PosLog (50%) Compacting PosLog to 50% of its size using the
method from Section 4.1
PosLog (10%) Compacting PosLog to 10% of its size using the
method from Section 4.1
MRF The L1 learned models from [21]
Baseline A model which predicts all variables to be false
To generate queries, we randomly selected k literals (where 1 ≤
k ≤ number of variables −1) for each test example to serve as the
evidence and then predicted the most probable assignment for the re-
maining variables. We measured both accuracy, which is the fraction
of examples predicted correctly, and the average Hamming distance
between the test-set example and the predicted world.
The results for the MAP inference experiments are shown in Fig-
ure 4 and the sizes of the respective models are in Table 2. In general,
the possibilistic logic theories outperform MRFs for small evidence
sets and do slightly worse for larger ones. Intuitively, the possibilis-
tic logic theories approximate the density in a coarser way than the
MRFs. This seems to lead to more robust results for hard problem in-
stances (i.e. small evidence sizes), but less precise predictions for the
easier instances. Interestingly, approximately compacting the possi-
bilistic logic theories hardly affects the quality of the results in most
cases. For NLTCS, however, the 10% theory has been reduced to the
point that it only suggests to set everything to false, which is why the
result in this case coincides with the baseline.
To evaluate the performance on marginal queries, we randomly
sample conjunctions and compute the marginals of the conjunctions
on the test set. Figure 5 shows the queries’ predicted and empiri-
cal test-set probabilities for both possibilistic logic and MRFs on the
NLTCS dataset. In this case, MRFs always obtained higher marginal
Table 1. Left: A possibilistic logic theory modelling a subset of the Plants dataset containing four states: California (ca), Montana (mt), New Mexico (nm)
and Texas (tx). Right: An approximation of the possibilistic logic theory by short default rules (with antecedents being conjunctions of at most two literals).
Possibilistic logic theory Approximation by default rules
(ca ∨ nm ∨ ¬tx ∨ ¬mt, λ14), (nm ∨ ¬tx ∨ ¬mt, λ13), (ca ∨ ¬tx ∨ ¬mt, λ12), |∼¬ca, |∼¬mt, |∼¬nm, |∼¬tx, nm |∼ tx,
(ca ∨ ¬nm ∨ ¬mt, λ11), (tx ∨ ¬ca ∨ ¬nm ∨ mt, λ10), (¬ca ∨ ¬tx ∨ nm, λ9), ca ∧ mt |∼ nm, ca ∧ mt |∼ tx, ca ∧ nm |∼mt,
(¬ca ∨ ¬nm ∨ mt, λ8), (¬nm ∨ tx ∨ ¬mt, λ7), (¬ca ∨ nm ∨ ¬mt, λ6), ca ∧ tx |∼mt, ca ∧ tx |∼ nm, nm ∧ mt |∼ ca,
(tx ∨ ¬nm, λ5), (¬tx ∨ ¬mt, λ4), (¬mt, λ3), (¬nm, λ2), (¬tx, λ1), (¬ca, λ0) tx ∧ mt |∼ ca, tx ∧ mt |∼ nm
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Figure 4. Top: Fraction of worlds correctly predicted by MAP inference on NLTCS, MSNBC and Plants datasets, measured on hold-out test sets. Bottom:
Average Hamming error of possible worlds predicted by MAP inference, measured on hold-out test sets.
Table 2. The number of rules, average number of literals in a rule or
branch for a tree, and the size which is the sum of rule lengths or number of
nodes of a tree.
Dataset Model #Rules (#Branches) Avg. lengh Size
N
LT
C
S
PosLog 121 3.0 363
PosLog (50%) 71 2.4 172
PosLog (10%) 16 1 16
Tree 122 10.9 243
MRF 135 1.9 254
M
SN
B
C
PosLog 258 4.5 1153
PosLog (50%) 172 3.3 572
PosLog (10%) 53 2.1 109
Tree 259 10.8 517
MRF 136 1.9 289
Pl
an
ts
PosLog 632 7.15 4523
PosLog (50%) 467 4.8 2244
PosLog (10%) 198 2.3 446
Tree 655 18.6 1306
MRF 2322 2.0 4713
log-likelihood. Nevertheless, the possibilistic logic theories’ still of-
fer competitive estimates along with the improved interpretability.
The other datasets offer qualitatively similar results.
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Figure 5. Scatter plots of estimated and empirical marginal probabilities of
randomly generated queries on NLTCS dataset. Left: Possibilistic logic.
Right: MRF.
6 CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced a practical method for constructing interpretable
possibilistic logic models of probability distributions. The learned
models support a variety of inference tasks, such as computing MAP
queries and estimating marginal probabilities. Owing to the proper-
ties of possibilistic logic, the learned models can be easily edited by
explicitly modifying, adding or removing logical rules, or they can
be combined together. To maintain the ability to compute marginal
probabilities after such modifications, we have proposed a parameter
reestimation method based on geometric programming. Our exper-
iments suggest that the method can be very useful for constructing
interpretable logical theories from data.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work has been supported by a grant from the Leverhulme Trust
(RPG-2014-164). Jesse Davis is partially supported by the KU Leu-
ven Research Fund (C22/15/015), and FWO-Vlaanderen (G.0356.12,
SBO-150033).
A APPENDIX
A.1 Probability-possibility transformation
A standard method to give a probabilistic interpretation to possibil-
ity degrees is by associating a possibility measure Π with a fam-
ily of probability measures, defined as P(Π) = {P |P (A) ≤
Π(A), ∀A ⊆ Ω}. This view leads to the following probability-
possibility transformation [11]. Let p be a probability distribution on
Ω = {ω1, ..., ωn} and assume w.l.o.g. that p(ωi) ≥ p(ωi+1). Then
p induces a possibility distribution pip defined as pip(ω1) = 1 and for
i > 1:
pip(ωi) =
{∑n
j=i p(ωj) if p(ωi−1) > p(ωi)
pip(ωi−1) otherwise
In [19], a syntactic counterpart of this transformation was used to
associate each Markov logic network M with a possibilistic logic
theory Θ, such that for p the probability distribution associated with
M and pi the possibility distribution associated with Θ it holds that
p(ω1) ≤ p(ω2) iff pi(ω1) ≤ pi(ω2). As a result, (Θ, α) `poss β iff
β is true in all the most probable models of α (w.r.t. p). Other prob-
abilistic interpretations of possibility distributions view possibility
degrees as the contour function of a mass assignment, in the con-
text of Dempster-Shafer evidence theory [28], or interpret possibility
distributions as likelihood functions [9].
For completeness, we present a variant of Transformation 1 corre-
sponding to a direct syntactic counterpart of the standard probability-
possibility transformation.
Transformation 4. Let V be the set of propositional variables. Let T
be a density estimation tree. Let B = {B1, . . . , Bk} be the set of all
branches of the tree, represented as conjunctions, and let p1, . . . , pk
be the estimated probabilities of worlds consistent with the respective
branches, i.e. if ω |= Bi then p(ω) = pi. Let us assume w.l.o.g. that
pi ≥ pi+1. Let us define w1 = 1. For i > 1, we define:
wi =
{∑n
j=i pj · 2|V|−|Bj | if pi−1 > pi
wi−1 otherwise
We define the possibilistic logic theory corresponding to T as ΘT =
{(¬Bi, 1− wi)|Bi ∈ B}.
A.2 Lexicographic pruning of default rule theories
Default rules of the form α |∼β, intuitively meaning “if α then typi-
cally β”, offer a convenient way to make what is encoded by a pos-
sibilistic logic theory more explicit. If we take a purely qualitative
view of possibilistic logic theories (i.e. if we see the weights merely
as a way of specifying a ranking of possible worlds), a possibilistic
logic theory Θ can be seen as a compact encoding of a set of default
rules, i.e. a default theory, where a default α |∼β is in that theory
if and only if (Θ, {α}) `poss β. The resulting default rules tend to
be easy to interpret, but an exhaustive enumeration of all defaults
would lead to theories in which many of the defaults are redundant.
To cope with this problem, we rely on the lexicographic closure of
default rules, which we describe next. The lexicographic closure [1]
is one of several closures that have been studied in the field of non-
monotonic reasoning, which allow us to represent an exhaustive set
of defaults by a smaller set of defaults from which the complete set
can be reconstructed. Smaller sets are usually easier for humans to
understand.
To describe the lexicographic closure of default rules, first recall
the Z-ordering from [24]. A default α |∼β is said to be tolerated by
a set of defaults γ1 |∼ δ1, ..., γm |∼ δm if the classical formula α ∧
β ∧ ∧i(¬γi ∨ δi) is consistent. The Z-ordering is a stratification
∆1, ...,∆k of a set ∆ of default rules, where each ∆j contains all
defaults α |∼β from ∆ \ (∆1 ∪ ...∆j−1) which are tolerated by
∆\(∆1∪...∪∆j−1). It can be shown that such a stratification always
exists when ∆ satisfies some natural consistency properties (see [24]
for details). Intuitively, ∆1 contains the most general default rules,
∆2 contains exceptions to the rules in ∆1, ∆3 contains exceptions
to the rules in ∆2, etc. The lexicographic closure of a set of default
rules is given as follows [1, 2]. For a possible world ω, we write
sat(ω,∆j) for the number of defaults from ∆j that are satisfied by
ω, i.e. sat(ω,∆j) = |{α |∼β : (α |∼β) ∈ ∆j , ω |= ¬α ∨ β}|. We
say that an interpretation ω1 is lex-preferred over an interpretation
ω2, written ω1 ≺ ω2, if there exists a j such that sat(ω1,∆j) >
sat(ω2,∆j) while sat(ω1,∆i) = sat(ω2,∆i) for all i > j. The
default α |∼β is in the lex.closure of ∆ if β is satisfied in all the
most lex-preferred models of α, i.e. ∀ω ∈ JαK : (ω 6|= β) ⇒ ∃ω′ ∈JαK : ω′ ≺ ω, where JαK is the set of models of α.
Now we can describe pruning of a (large) set of default rules ∆,
closed under the axioms of System P and rational monotonicity [18].
Our aim is not to construct the smallest set of defaults, as such a set
could actually be more difficult to interpret. In particular, to maintain
interpretability we only remove a rule if it is “implied” by a set of
rules which are all shorter or equally long (as shorter rules are more
interpretable). Furthermore note that methods for constructing the
smallest set of defaults are likely to be computationally harder. Let
∆1,∆2, . . . ,∆k be the Z-ordering of ∆. Let us write |α |∼β| for
the length of the default α |∼β, e.g. the sum of literal occurrences in
the antecedent α and consequent β. First we iteratively prune rules
which are redundant in the rational closure sense – we remove a rule
α |∼β if (ΘR, {α}) `poss β where ΘR = ⋃ki=1{(¬γ∨δ, 1/(k− i+
1))|γ |∼ δ ∈ ∆i} \ {¬α∨ β}. Then we iteratively prune the rules in
∆ as follows. Iterating i from 1 upwards, let α |∼β ∈ ∆i. Let L =
|α |∼β|. Let Φj = {¬γ ∨ δ|γ |∼ δ ∈ ∆j \ {α |∼β} and |γ |∼ δ| ≤
L and α∧(¬γ∨δ) 6` ⊥} and let Θ = ⋃i−1j=1{(ϕ, 1/(k−j+1))|ϕ ∈
Φj} be a possibilistic logic theory. If (Θ, {α}) `poss β we remove
α |∼β from ∆ and repeat this process for other rules in ∆. It can
be shown that all default rules from the initial set are contained in
the lexicographic closure of the resulting, pruned set (although the
closures themselves might differ if the original set was not closed).
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